19 ideas
| 22304 | Truth is conceivability, or the systematic coherence of a significant whole [Joachim] |
| 18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
| 18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
| 18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
| 18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
| 18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
| 18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
| 18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
| 18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
| 18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |